By Michael Lelyveld
Boston, April 6
(RFE/RL)
The countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia can only watch with dismay at events unfolding in Kosovo, as NATO struggles in its confrontation with Yugoslavia�s Serbs.
The ambitions of nations like Azerbaijan to associate themselves with NATO has been based on perceptions that the alliance provides a guarantee of security, an assurance that now seems in doubt. Both Presidents Heidar Aliev of Azerbaijan and Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan have announced plans to travel to Washington this month to take part in NATO�s 50th anniversary ceremonies. But with the outcome in Kosovo uncertain, some analysts have raised questions about whether the event should take place at all. If it does, it is likely to be a somber rather than a joyous occasion.
For all the differences between the Balkans and the Caucasus-Central Asia region, there are enough similarities to give the leaders pause. Ethnic conflicts, isolation, rough terrain, independence movements, economic hardship. For the Caspian nations, the Soviet collapse and Russia�s efforts to reassert its influence have tended to make most of these factors worse.
But if the countries of the region saw NATO as a counterbalance or a source of possible relief, their hopes have certainly dimmed during the past two weeks. Yet, they may still see little alternative to pursuing NATO links, other than to retreat back into the Russian sphere.
Azerbaijan has been most vocal about seeking the security of the NATO umbrella. In addition to its calls for establishing a NATO air base at Baku, it has also dropped out of the CIS security structure.
In the past week, Azerbaijan�s National Security Minister Namik Abbasov, charged that both Russia and Iran have mounted intelligence activities against Azerbaijan in attempts to destabilize it. The country is clearly looking toward the United States and NATO to save it from its neighbors and provide an outlet for its oil. Also last week, Aliev showed what appeared to be remarkable restraint in declaring that he has declined an offer of arms from Russia to match those that Moscow has supplied to Armenia, or to its own bases there. On the surface, Aliev had the good sense to avoid the start of an arms race, which could allow Russia to justify the $1 billion in weapons that it has supplied to Armenia in the past.
But there are likely to be other reasons for Aliyev to reject the reported offer so publicly. New Russian warplanes and surface-to-air missiles would only serve to increase Azerbaijan�s dependence on Russian technicians and spare parts instead of putting it on the path of NATO-compatible weaponry.
Despite Aliev�s criticism of an arms buildup, it would not be surprising if he were to follow his refusal of Russian help with an appeal for Western military aid. By going public, he may be implying that Azerbaijan could be forced into regrettable alternatives if the West turns him down.
The United States will be more wary about any additional commitments after its Kosovo experience, however. The chance of a NATO base in Baku, which previously seemed remote, may now be impossible.
Much may depend on the outcome of the Kosovo operation, including the willingness of the American public to support NATO expansions farther to the east. Membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic hardly raised a ripple of attention in U.S. public opinion, leaving the issue to supporters among ethnic constituencies. But the difficulties of Kosovo could soon shut NATO�s open door. For the past half-century, NATO�s authority has been largely theoretical. The war in Kosovo is testing its resolve. It may also set new bounds for membership and expectations of success.
NATO�s three new members did not face any imminent threats, a fact that eased their way into the alliance. The same cannot be said for Azerbaijan, which has made its case for NATO ties precisely by emphasizing its conflicts with Russia, Armenia and Iran.
The insecurity of its situation can hardly be a selling point to the United States or NATO in their current dilemma over Kosovo. The allies may not only be unwilling but unable to deal with any further instability. The prize of Caspian oil may no longer be seen as an incentive, because its very value requires protection and security.
This difficulty will not be lost on Russia, which stands to benefit from the Kosovo conflict, no matter what the outcome. If NATO prevails, it will certainly become even more wary of any similar commitments toward the Caspian region, leaving Russia with a strong hand to play. If NATO fails, Moscow�s hand could become even stronger, despite its economic weakness.
Countries in the region may soon see good reason to become more accommodating toward Russia, adding a dose of reality to their dreams of NATO ties. Despite words of defiance, Caspian nations may wish to cover their bets and recognize that even a superpower cannot guarantee them a secure world.
ALMATY, April 8
(Specially for THE GLOBE)
In the US geo-strategic conception, Kazakhstan�s territory is called �a zone of crossing interests between the USA and China�. You do not need to be a specialist in international affairs to realize the seriousness of this determination and its danger to the future of our state.
The way that the USA settles peace and defends their interests is confirmed even more strikingly by their unforgivable military actions in Iraq and Serbia, than by their words about democracy and humanism. The Chinese expansion in respect to Kazakhstan has begun. But we do not seem to have the systematic internal policy. We have not foreseen the threat to our state and have not taken any effective measures to neutralize it.
As far as the disputed land at the Kazakhstan-Chinese border is concerned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan declared that it is of a miserable economic value. This statement contradicts to the widely known documents of the doctor of geological sciences L.F. Kislitsina-Didenko, confirming presence of industrial gold and lead reserves in Saryshild. Our parliament, the island of complacent penguins, unanimously ratified the agreement on the border. Meanwhile the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, inspired by the obvious success in this matter, ordered the Sintszyan Uighur Autonomous Republic (SUAR) to hasten the utilization of the bordering rivers for Sintszyan�s economic purposes. We have received both the texts of that order and the documents prepared in the SUAR on its basis, through the people�s diplomacy channels. There is no word concerning the water-resource problems of Kazakhstan in the basin of these rivers.
A strict schedule of redirecting the Black Irtysh river to the town of Karamai by October 1, 1999 along with an obligatory settlement of all the technical problems �within twenty four hours�, was worked out. Similar documents were prepared for the rivers Ili and Tekes. All the documents mention �the favorable time� (the initiative belongs to the Chinese side), and the urgent necessity to solve all the questions concerning the bordering rivers before China signs the corresponding international agreements.
China settles its problems coolly and rigidly. The country does not want to take the trouble to confirm its good-neighbourly feelings to Kazakhstan. Having such a neighbour, was it possible to assume that by handing over the disputed land we would settle our border problems? In fact, this was only the beginning of the process. The redirection of a significant part of the bordering rivers, which is planned by the Chinese side, threatens large territories of Semirechye, Eastern and Central Kazakhstan with serious ecological consequences. This is one of the forms of the Chinese expansion.
According to elementary logic, the problem of the disputed sites should have been settled along with the problem of the trans-bordering rivers. This did not happen. Rather, Kazakhstan conceded its strong arguments to defend its bordering interests.
We understand perfectly well that China is indeed a great, dynamically developing country. Friendly links with such a giant are extremely important and desirable for Kazakhstan. At the same time, we also know that we should not waive our strategic interests. We must build up our relations with skill and dignity.
Based upon these principles, the �Azamat� party recommends that the Government of Kazakhstan should involve Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the negotiations on the bordering rivers. Russia � because of its natural interest in the fate of Irtysh. Kyrgyzstan � as its rivers flowing through China, were traditionally a factor deterrent the hydrotechnical plans of China till the sovereign states were established in Central Asia.
Taking into consideration the stake of Kazakhstan�s community on the problem of the bordering rivers, we do not doubt that this time it will be well-informed about the negotiation process.
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