Michael Paterson
ALMATY, March 2
(THE GLOBE)
The world�s second largest auto company officially entered the Kazakh market on Tuesday. The Ford Motor Company has invested heavily in the FSU, with 40 dealerships in Russia, as well as operations in the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. However, the opening of the sales and servicing centre of RAM Auto Almaty Ltd, is Ford�s first venture into this country.
Located at 157-B Suyubaya ave., the franchise is actually 100% owned by the Turkish Koc International Trade Group. The Group has worked with Ford for many years in Turkey.
According to Ronald Plomp, Ford�s Sales Manager of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the first models to be featured in the 550 metre showroom were chosen because they best fit Kazakhstan�s particular road and climate conditions. The vehicles include the Ford Escort, Ford Mondeo, Ford Explorer, Ford Transit, Ford Super Duty F-Series and �Cargo� trucks.
�Of course, we would like to expand our model range to Kazakhstan,� stated Plomp. �We would like to introduce vehicles such as the Ford Focus and the F-series pickup truck.� However, the vehicles require modifications before they will be suitable for entry to Kazakhstan. The Ford Focus for instance, will be raised 7 millimetres to accomodate Kazakhstan�s road conditions. The car�s fuel sensitive engine must also be modified to smoothly accept the country�s 91/92 octane run fuel.
The introduction of any car to Kazakhstan must be economically feasible, taking into consideration the costs involved with a new model such as servicing, the importation of special tools and the training of mechanics. Because there are no reliable statistics on the size of the potential market, revenue calculation is extremely difficult. As a result, the company�s sales expectations for the first few years are modest. �We believe the industry of new imported passenger cars and light commercials is somewhere in the range of 6000 to 7000 units. Our target, in the first 2 years, is 5% of the imported industry. Once we are fully established throughout the Republic, we want to achieve a 10% market share,� confided Plomb.
During his presentation, Mr. Plomb stated that at the present time, all Ford products are American or European. However, when confronted by a query that some vehicles may be produced in Belarus, the sales manager confirmed that, �they are produced in Belarus. But all the components are coming from our factory in England and Germany.� Mr. Plomb explained that it was cheaper to bring in the vehicles from �the ultra-modern� Belarussian factory than to import the products in one piece from England and Germany, because of the advantages of the customs union between Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan.
The representatives also fielded questions concerning the plans to import the Ford Focus, a query about the popularity of pickups, rumours of the launch of a new series car, problems with Ford�s operations in Belarus, and the uncanny resemblance between the RAM symbol of the Koc Group and the Dodge Ram.
Regarding the potential consequences of Ford�s proposed merger with Volvo, Mr. Plomp was reluctant to comment. �There was a decision made by the management of Volvo and Ford to join , but it is still awaiting the confirmation of the shareholders of Volvo.� The sales manager also refused to speculate on potential future cooperation with the Volvo operations in Almaty.
Asked whether the company found the fluidity of Kazakh legislation confusing, Mr. Plomp diplomatically replied, �The customs tariffs are changing all the time, all over the world. I think that one good thing however, is that you have the customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. So at least the tariffs in all those three countries are the same.�
Provided that there are no major shocks, Ford plans to open dealerships and service centres in Astana, Atyrau, and Karaganda later this year. Despite the small size of Astana, the firm believes it will be able to take advantage of the government fleet potential. The other locations are attractive because of their population base. But Mr. Plomp also emphasized the importance of having a network of Ford centres spread out throughout the country able service Ford vehicles.
Questions about future investment were directed to the representative of the Koc Group. At the present moment, the representative confirmed that there are no plans to bring any production facilities to Kazakhstan. Rather the central location and larger, denser population of Uzbekistan made it more suitable for the Group�s manufacturing needs. A new factory for microbuses and trucks will open in Uzbekistan later this month.
However, the Koc Group does have other interests in Kazakhstan. In April, the Group expects to open RamStore, a giant supermarket and superstore here in Almaty. The Koc representative emphasized that investing in Kazakhstan requires a long-term, not short term outlook.
On March 1, the Justice Ministry registered the Republican People�s Party of Kazakhstan. The process of registration had been consistently deferred and leaving many people to believe that it would never take place. It seems that the Ministry invented any way possible to avoid registering the Party. In the middle of February, a correspondent of the Globe had a talk with one of the high officials of the Ministry. The latter mentioned a document banning the registration of several public and political organizations, including the Republican People�s Party.
In the opinion of Gaziz Aldamzharov, Deputy Chairman of the Party, the help of many international organizations, including the OSCE and the American Republican Party, were instrumental in overcoming the problem. Representatives of both of the aforementioned organizations personally appealed before the Ministry to register of the new Party.
�The authorities were compelled to register us,� said Gaziz Aldamzharov. The correspondent of the Globe was the first to get an exclusive interview after the registration of the Party.
1. �To be or not to be��
�I had no doubts that eventually we would be registered. If supposing, they didn�t register us, we would realize our activity through other officially sanctioned public movements. We would eventually be successful in achieving the goal. We accepted the program and the charter of the Party at the January Congress in Almaty, despite being closely watched by the law enforcement organs. The provisions for our regional branches were also accepted at that time.
As was reported by the media, the authorities began to obstruct the registration of our Party at once. However, I believe first, that the results of the Presidential election were of help to us. Clever people can always properly appreciate their true value. No-one in the democratic institutions said �this election was democratic or in compliance with the principles of the OSCE, of which Kazakhstan is a member.�
Second, we applied to many international public organizations with a request to support us in our moment of difficulty. Our request was granted. The authorities were compelled to register this Party. Otherwise, the authorities would make heroes of us, which was not in their interests.�
2. Regarding our participation in the parliamentary elections:
�We will participate anyway, whenever they are conducted, no matter what the conditions. Of course, we would like to win as many parliamentary seats as possible. We will offer candidates from 20 electoral districts. We will also contend 10 seats according to party lists. Kazhegeldin and I will both participate in the election. If a new election law is accepted, we will win 40-50% of the seats.
3. Regarding the Party �Otan�:
�Having just emerged, this Party violated the law. The charter and the program of the Party have not yet been worked out, but they still granted the President of the country, membership number one. How could a non-existent party issue a membership card? How could the President express his gratitude for it and become the Chairman of the Party? The President �temporarily� transferred his authority to Tereschenko. If the Party had been registered at that time, that was a direct violation of the law because the Party had neither a Charter or Program at that time.
4. They don�t love us:
�We have our branches in almost every oblast. The branches consist of our respected people who are not afraid of any persecution. You can understand that the authorities would never love this opposition party. During the process of registration, in many oblasts special inspections were authorized from above. As a result, our people were summoned to the prosecutor�s office. This was the case in the oblasts of both Semipalatinsk and East Kazakhstan. There were even accusations of violations of the law.�
5. Concerning the goals and the tasks of the Party:
�Our goal is to realize what is written up in the Constitution. We want to ensure the existence of a normal civil society in which the interests of all the people, not just a small Presidential circle, could be defended. Social achievements ought not to be lost, on the contrary, they ought to be preserved and their number increased. We want to revive the political life in Kazakhstan, thus compelling the authorities to do what is needed for the people.
Now, we are planning to hold the next Congress of the Republican People�s Party, as well as, the oblast Congresses. We will create discussion clubs and widely distribute information about ourselves. The main theme for today is to hold fair Parliamentary elections. The law on elections ought to be changed for this. A number of parties and public movements, including the Communist Party, are working towards this cause. We jointly with the OSCE, are examining this problem and preparing the relevant documents to address the President, the Government and the Parliament.�
6. Concerning Kazhegeldin:
Surely he is the leader of our Party. Rumors are circulating a case has been filed against Mr. Kazhegeldin and that he is afraid to return from abroad. During a recent conversation with him, Mr. Kazhegeldin confirmed that he would return to Kazakhstan and continue his party work. Thanks to Mr. Kazhegeldin, we have many international links with democratic institutions. We cannot become a strong opposition without these organizations� support.�
7. Regarding the �necessity� of direct Presidential rule:
�Not occasionally, this thought was sounded by Deputy Batalov. It is known that he never speaks his own words. Direct Presidential rule would be pernicious for the President himself. The President would be responsible for both good and evil. The latter in our society prevails. So, it is in the interests of the opposition for direct Presidential rule to be introduced.
8. Regarding the necessity of a defending the opposition:
�Today, it is very important to be able to defend the opposition. Otherwise, repressions are inevitable.�
Prepared by Kulimkhan KHASENOVA
(Continued from # 13(331), 14(332), 15(333), 16 (334), 17(335))
C. The Count
The protocol for the polling station is one of the most important election documents. It is a record of the ballot papers received at the polling station, those unused, those counted and those rejected. In addition, it lists the number of voters on the voter lists and the number who received ballots. The protocol is necessary if reconciliation of the ballot papers is to be done, including those from the advance, mobile and regular polls and the number of voters who received them. In the protocol�s two-page format, it was possible for fraud to occur, as the page with the results was not the page that was signed at the polling station. At the suggestion of the ODIHR Assessment Mission, the protocol was reprinted on one page.
There appeared to be no concept of the need to balance the number of ballot papers used with the number of voters. The number of ballot papers received by the precinct polling station was often not recorded on the protocol during the opening. The need for uniform procedures at the count is of paramount importance to encourage trust in the system. A methodology for the steps of the count, as well as guidelines for what constitutes an invalid ballot, needs to be developed and incorporated into a training manual.
Many voters think that the outcome of the count is pre-determined and that the numbers are manipulated to bring that about. One polling station chairman confirmed that he had been asked to deliver a certain result (80%) for the incumbent. It is not clear who made the request. At one count observed by the mission the numbers recorded on the protocol were changed from the numbers of ballot papers counted. The protocol must include space for remarks from observers and candidates� representatives. This may prevent the temptation to change the numbers on the protocol.
It was reported to the OSCE Assessment Mission that in some cases the count at the polling station was not announced or posted at the polling station. The results did not include the number of those who voted against all candidates. Since the CEC had stated that those numbers would be announced, it is hoped that they will be published in the final results.
D. Observers
The Decree on Elections provides for candidates to have representatives at the polling stations. The incumbent�s campaign staff accredited enough representatives for all polling stations. Other candidates accredited a smaller number, not sufficient to have representatives at all locations. International and domestic observers were also present in small numbers. Candidate teams held some training sessions for their representatives and public associations and NGOs sponsored some training sessions for domestic observers. The international observers were not co-ordinated or trained by a central body.
Candidates� representatives experienced some harassment by police and by members of the precinct election commissions. Two candidates forwarded information to the Mission about such incidents. There were several reports of representatives and observers not being allowed to witness the count, including international observers, domestic observers and members of the Mission. In some cases, they were physically ejected. In other cases, the translators of international observers were threatened or harassed. Even when the observers and representatives were allowed to watch the count, they were often not able to see the protocols. In fact, some groups of observers were informed that it was �not the observer�s business� to see results.
The CEC provisions clearly allowed observers to attend the count. The precinct election commissions, however, made their own arbitrary decisions. Observers were also not welcome at the district and oblast election commissions to watch the results arriving from the polling stations. Observers and candidates� representatives were often prevented from following mobile boxes as well. These rights of the observers and candidates� representatives to attend at the count and at each stage of the voting process need to be explicitly stated at the training of the commissions and in training manuals, and needs to be enforced in practice.
The candidates� representatives need more training on their role. They expressed dissatisfaction with some of the actions at the polling stations but did not know they had the right to report irregularities. A more credible presence of these representatives, covering all polling stations, would assist in ensuring that the law is followed.
The commissions set arbitrary rules about how close observers could be to the voting and counting (i.e. some set 10 metres as the distance, others set 30 metres). There are no such rules in the law. The only stipulation is that they do not interfere with the work of the election commission or with the voting or counting.
VII. Election Complaints
The CEC received complaints during the election campaign and investigated them. One of the candidates entered several complaints and forwarded copies to the Mission. The CEC informed the Mission that there were no �serious� complaints that had to be addressed by a court. It was difficult to ascertain whether the complaints were taken seriously by the CEC or seen merely as �frivolous� complaints.
The Mission also received copies of letters of complaints registered by some voters after election day. At this writing, it is not known if these have been addressed by the CEC. The complaints will not likely affect the outcome of the election but it is hoped that they will be investigated and answered.
There is a need for a more open system of processing election complaints, particularly during the campaign period. Accusations of unfairness are often reported in the media but the resolution of the complaint is not publicised. A standardised, well understood system of addressing complaints, both during the campaign and after the voting and count, would add to the public acceptance of the decisions of the CEC and the courts.
VIII. Conclusions
The OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission found that the election process fell far short of the standards to which the Republic of Kazakstan is committed as an OSCE participating State. The areas of concern include the following:
Duration of the election campaign. The timing of the amendments to the Constitution meant that an election would take place earlier than previously scheduled. The period allocated for the election campaign did not allow for sufficient preparation by all prospective candidates given the circumstances that brought about these elections.
Legislative framework. The election process is governed by a Presidential Decree that falls far short of OSCE commitments. Although Parliament has been amending this Decree since it was promulgated in 1995, election legislation adopted by the Parliament following a public debate would enhance the credibility of the election process.
Election commissions. The appointment of the election commissions at each level are controlled by the President and appointed local officials. The method of appointment and the makeup of the commissions do not encourage public trust in the electoral process. The election commissions need to be more independent and representative.
Infringements on rights of citizens to seek public office. Of particular concern are the 8 May 1998 amendments to Article 4 of the Decree on Elections, disqualifying potential candidates who had received a minor administrative sanction for an �intentional offence� during the year before registration. This new provision was used to prevent the registration of two would-be candidates. The application of this article contradicts the OSCE principle contained in the 1990 Copenhagen Document that an �administrative decision against a person must be fully justifiable.� In one of the two cases the 8 May 1998 amendments were applied retroactively, disqualifying a potential candidate who had an administrative sanction levied against him in early 1998. In addition, the number of signatures and the monetary fee for candidature appear high, particularly in light of the short period allocated for the campaign.
(To be continued)
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