From the editors:
The Radio Liberty editorial below levels sharp and open criticism at Akezhan Kazhegeldin. It is worth pointing out that the first subjects of the sweeping privatization efforts headed by the former Prime Minister were the Sokolovsko-Sarbaisk concentrating mill, as well the chrome and aluminum industries. All three deals were associated with the Chyorny brothers, a name linked to many scandals in Kazakhstan.
But it is not the suspicious activity in Kazhegeldin�s past which strikes us, but rather how rapidly he gained recognition in the U.S. as a fighter for democracy. To gain recognition in Washington circles, Kazhegeldin had a team of powerful insiders, a team including three people connected with VP Al Gore�s staff. It was they who ensured Kazhegeldin a clean-cut image and useful contacts in Washington.
One must not forget that the US finances Radio Liberty. While Radio Liberty enjoys freedoms that stations in Kazakhstan may only dream about, it remains essentially an American voice. Now, Radio Liberty criticizes Kazhegeldin. But one must wonder if earlier, the Radio Liberty bureau in Moscow knew more about Kazhegeldin�s career than they let on.
It is difficult to say whether the current proposals of dialogue between Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin are genuine or if they are new manipulations, this time by Astana. Either way, Radio Liberty seems close to the truth.
Dec 1
(Radio Liberty)
Political developments this year were as decisive for Kazakhstan as they were for Azerbaijan and Ukraine. This biggest Central Asian republic saw a conflict where the present administration faced an opposition headed by a former national statesmen. Akezhan Kazhegeldin, the person who headed the government from 1994 to 1997 is now President Nazarbaev�s greatest political opponent.
Kazhegeldin astonishingly quickly transformed from the biggest Kazakhstani oligarch to a convinced supporter of democracy and progressive reforms. He began to criticize �the regime of personal power of Nursultan Nazarbaev and his surroundings�. This sudden and fast metamorphosis was not noticed, yet outside Kazakhstan, especially in Russia and the USA, many observers who did not know the past of this man perceived his opposition to Nazarbaev as a worthy democratic cause.
Meanwhile, the speed with which the former Kazakhstan Prime Minister became famous in the USA proves that he was supported by powerful financial circles interested in his acknowledgment (mainly by the White House) as a possible successor of Nazarbaev. Efforts and money spent to achieve this goal may be compared only with expenses towards the Presidential election campaign in Kazakhstan.
The goal was almost achieved. Some representatives of the US administration associated Akezhan Kazhegeldin with the democratic opposition in Kazakhstan. He managed to show himself as the only real democratic leader of the country.
However, the previous Presidential and Parliamentary election proved that President Nazarbaev�s administration was unable to keep power, having assured the West that that was unavoidable and having demonstrated the hidden motives of Akezhan Kazhegeldin�s.
At first his comrades left him, literally at the eve of the decisive stage of the Parliamentary election. Once it was explained that Kazhegeldin did not keep his promises to support his own political organization, the Republican People�s Party, that support dried up fast.
But it turned out that the founder of this party could not keep his promises, as circumstances that he faced had changed significantly.
The Russian and Kazakhstani press published information that Akezhan Kazhegeldin had close ties with the scandalous Chyornys brothers. It was announced that Trans World Group controlled by the Chyornys, which owned many enterprises in Kazakhstan, had to leave the country after Kazhegeldin had been dismissed from the post of the Prime Minister. TWG was accused of irresponsible management of local enterprises, which was proven in court. Hence, contracts with the company were cancelled.
One of the brothers, Lev Chyorny, once a close business partner of Kazhegeldin, esponded to Kazhegeldin�s proposal to try to return to Kazakhstan. But to do that it was necessary to return Kazhegeldin to power. There was no alternative. If we take into consideration information presented in the press, that was how this alliance restored.
Commercial structures as well as companies with similar doubtful reputation, headed by Lev Chyorny, credited Kazhegeldin and paid for his campaign to create his democratic image and to discredit President Nazarbaev. According to different estimates, US$ 15 to 18 million was spent to these ends.
Today when it is clear that Kazhegeldin has lost; he has to repay credits. The former Prime Minister has debts not only to his present partners and protectors. His other former companions also announced their claims to Kazhegeldin. They accuse him of swindling while privatizing phosphorous plants in southern Kazakhstan. They ascertain that Kazhegeldin lined his pocket manipulating interests of several companies pretending to manage local mines and concentrating mills.
The same happened with the grain elevators in northern Kazakhstan. Here Akezhan Kazhegeldin successfully worked with Russian companies from the northern Caucasus. If once they believed in his promises and hoped that the disgraced Prime Minister will come to power, today their belief is exhausted.
Taking into consideration statements by Lev Chyorny, it is difficult to say whom Kazhegeldin fears more: the law-reinforcement organizations that blame him for illegal money laundering or his former partners who are ready to revenge themselves upon for deceiving and hollow promises, according to their own laws.
Maybe, the most important thing is that the West�s attitude to Kazhegeldin has changed completely. Information on his cooperation with criminals opened eyes of many people and made them reconsider their position. Today Washington does not welcome Kazhegeldin with polite smiles, but asks him to explain the information of his ties with the Russian Mafia.
Besides, now he cannot count on powerful financial support by his former partners. For him, in fact, that means the end of his career of an opposition democrat.
ALMATY, Nov 30
(IIA POLITON)
Recently President Nazarbaev announced in an interview with the TV channel Khabar that he was ready to cooperate with the opposition. He also said that he was interested in inviting the former Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, leader of the Republican People�s Party of Kazakhstan, to return to Kazakhstan and to participate in the political life of the republic. Kazhegeldin�s appeal to Nazarbaev proposing to start a dialogue between the authorities and the opposition was a response to that announcement. The Independent Informational Agency PoliTon polled experts in this regard.
Experts� estimation of the dialogue between Nursultan Nazarbaev and Akezhan Kazhegeldin was varied.
One group of experts appreciates these efforts. In their opinion, today the President needs a dialogue with the opposition. This situation is profitable to Kazhegeldin as well. If before the President ignored both his opinions and appeals, now he is able to speak to Nazarbaev equally and even lay down some conditions. These experts emphasize that in fact Nazarbaev acknowledged Kazhegeldin the leader of the Kazakhstani opposition. Kazhegeldin�s positions are strengthened by the fact that he made the appeal on behalf of the Forum of Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan. Some experts say that Kazhegeldin repeatedly stated that it was necessary to create consensus with Nazarbaev. Thus, experts think that the dialogue between President Nazarbaev and the former PM has started and it will be continued in future.
Another group of the experts doubts that a dialogue between Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin is possible. They consider the President�s statement propagandistic. Anyhow, the President did not make any concrete proposals to either Kazhegeldin or the opposition. Possibly, Nazarbaev did not expect Kazhegeldin to answer and to be ready for cooperation. Some experts are confident that Nazarbaev announced that at the eve of the OSCE summit in Istanbul to excuse results of the Parliamentary election and to demonstrate he was ready to compromise. In general, this group of experts considers the union of the President and the former Prime Minister impossible.
Some respondents are surprised by Kazhegeldin�s response. In their opinion, for the period when Nursultan Nazarbaev has been ruling everyone could see that he would not share his power with anybody. Hence, even if he negotiates with the opposition, he will not accept their conditions on radical reorganization of the political system. Experts think that Kazhegeldin had no grounds to call the President for national conciliation, as there is no civil war in Kazakhstan.
The opinion that the President�s announcement was to break off the opposition is also noteworthy. Some analysts ascertain that majority of the Kazakhstani opposition is former state functionaries who are eager to come to power again. In their opinion, these people will easily make compromise with the President under his conditions and will stop their opposition activity if they are offered state posts.
Reasons for the dialogue between the two leaders mentioned by the experts are as follows. From the point of view of Nazarbaev�s interests:
1) To demonstrate loyalty to the opposition before the international community to improve its attitude to Kazakhstan after criticism of republic�s democracy by international organizations;
2) To support of Nazarbaev�s image affected after the election to restore trust to him as a rigid but just ruler;
3) To transform the antagonism between the authorities and the opposition to a personal conflict between Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin, in which �senior� one is ready to forgive �senior� ones� mistakes. That is Kazakhs mainly who are expected to understand this step;
4) To stop Kazhegeldin�s activity abroad, where during his numerous meetings, speeches and interviews he gives a negative estimation of Kazakhstani events.
As far as Kazhegeldin is concerned, the experts think he took a chance to start negotiations with Nazarbaev to determine conditions to come to power, to heighten his rating and to become the real leader of the opposition.
Some experts think that both parties are equally interested in a compromise to prevent further �war of compromising materials�. In their opinion, inside the present elite there are unofficial rules that in case of somebody is dismissed neither present nor former state functionaries should not break definite rules in respect to each other. Experts believe the President was the first who violated these rules in respect to Kazhegeldin and provoked his similar actions. At present Nazarbaev does not want his conflict with Kazhegeldin to be discussed in the West. Besides, the recent story of official Kazakhstani accounts in Switzerland found by Swiss investigators, materials compromising Kazhegeldin affected the ruling elite at the rebound. In connection with this some analysts consider it possible that the President was forced by his surroundings to start a dialogue with Kazhegeldin. Kazhegeldin, in his own turn, wants guarantees to return to Kazakhstan and to conduct public and political activity.
Experts� opinions regarding further development of interrelations between Nursultan Nazarbaev and Akezhan Kazhegeldin differed as well.
One group of the experts supposes that both parties want to check the situation and possibility to achieve a mutually beneficial agreement. They consider it possible that Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin will conclude a deal for Kazhegeldin either to return to power or to abandon some restrictions on his political activity as a constructive opposition. Some experts mention that Kazhegeldin�s desire to negotiate with the President is proved by the fact that he has not published all materials compromising Nazarbaev that are at his disposal.
Another group of the experts thinks that no reconciliation between Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin will happen soon. In their opinion, the President will not negotiate with the opposition that demands to reconsider the Constitution principally, to cancel results of the previous election and to hold a new Parliamentary election. Some experts think that for Nazarbaev Kazhegeldin is not definitely a person who pretends to be a national leader entitled by people to conduct a national dialogue. Anyhow, the President does not want the former Prime Minister to return to Kazakhstan, as he will hardly abandon his pretence for power.
Some respondents consider that Kazhegeldin�s return to power is not profitable to the influential groups of the ruling elite, as it will result in redistribution of both power and property. They namely determine the President�s negative attitude to the former disgraced Prime Minister.
Some respondents think that during the OSCE summit Nursultan Nazarbaev managed to agree with the US administration making concessions on the oil business. In the result, for sometime the Kazakhstani opposition has lost the West�s interest as an instrument to pressure the authorities. That has strengthened the President�s positions and made him able to ignore the opposition, experts say.
As far as Kazhegeldin is concerned, he cannot return to the country where he has no serious guarantees of his safety. Some analysts think that due his ambitions he will not agree to occupy a state post without real power that the President may offer him. Some experts think Kazhegeldin will not accept conditions proposed by Nazarbaev at all, as he does not want to lose his political achievements. Hence, he will persist on his ambitions for the highest power. However, this circumstance will be another obstacle to the dialogue between him and the President.
Some experts pay attention to the fact that this opposition just worsens the political conflict. Obviously, the President will not make concessions to the opposition at all. Kazhegeldin does not treat this conflict as a personal one and plays a card of national political opposition. Under these conditions it is difficult to expect any consensus between the President and the former Prime Minister.
The third group of experts thinks that if there is any dialogue between Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin, conditions will be favorable to the President. The President may initiate a national dialogue himself and will establish an artificial structure like the Assembly of the Kazakhstani peoples. He will adopt representatives of all parties and movements to the new structure, but organizations loyal to the authorities will dominate. At the same time, we can hardly hope that Nazarbaev will agree to reconsider the Constitution and to hold a new Presidential and Parliamentary elections.
Some experts think that the character of relations between Nazarbaev and Kazhegeldin will be definitely determined after the President�s visit to the USA expected in December 1999. There is also an opinion that the situation after the Russian Presidential election will make both the Kazakhstani authorities and the opposition to seek a new political vector in respect to each other. Whatever the situation in Russia will be, the position of the entire opposition, including Kazhegeldin will be favorable. So, if a dictatorship is established in Russia, Nazarbaev will improve his relations with the West to prevent Russian expansion to Kazakhstan. But in this case he will have to follow his policy according to the international standards, including cancellation of different restriction on the opposition�s activity. If democrats come win in Russia, the Kazakhstani opposition may have serious allies.
All Over the Globe is published by IPA House.
© 1998 IPA House. All Rights Reserved.