28 October
(Stratfor)
SUMMARY
The attack by gunmen on the Armenian Parliament Oct. 27 could have implications beyond Armenia, exerting significant strategic impact on the entire Caucasus region. Russia could use the attack as an excuse to increase economic and strategic involvement. Russia needs control of the southern Caucasus and cannot afford to pass up the opportunity the crisis offers for increased involvement. The situation in Armenia is especially important now, since Russia�s relations with the rest of the region are strained due to disagreements over Russia�s campaign in Chechnya.
ANALYSIS
Ultra-nationalist gunmen attacked the Armenian Parliament Oct. 27, killing Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and several other top government officials. President Robert Kocharian is negotiating with the gunmen, who hold an estimated 30 hostages in Yerevan, Armenia�s capital.
This situation is a significant strategic opportunity for Russia, which can use the crisis to step-up involvement in Armenia, with the larger goal of asserting power over the entire Caucasus region. Caucasus stability is necessary for Russia. Economically, the southern Caucasus is the planned highway for the West to circumvent Russia in exploiting Caspian and Central Asian oil. If Russia is to retain control of those resources, it must maintain a presence in and pressure on the South Caucasus.
But Russia first needs control of the region. Because of its strained relations with Georgia and Chechnya due to the Chechen war, it does not have control. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan are thorns in Russia�s side. Both actively support the Chechens and are actively courting NATO. And although Russia has a close relationship with Armenia, it has not had a legitimate reason to increase its authority there. The crisis gives Russia its needed opening into the region.
Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are generally stable; however, in the course of its war in Chechnya, Russia has accused Azerbaijan of supporting Chechen rebels, possibly with weapons, a safe haven and uninhibited passage over their borders. Russia has also accused Azerbaijan of allowing the Chechen rebels to maintain an information center in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital. Azerbaijan denied these charges.
The southern Caucasus is wracked with political and economic instability, further inhibiting Russia�s control of the region. Armenia and Azerbaijan have had a long-standing, and often violent, feud over the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which lies in Azerbaijani territory.
Recently, the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have held numerous conferences negotiating the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. They expected to sign a preliminary agreement at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference slated for Nov. 17-19 in Istanbul. This issue is of great concern to the citizens of both countries. In fact, Nairi Unanian, the alleged lead gunmen in the attack on Parliament today, had formerly been allied with a political party whose main goal was the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.
However, if the gunmen hoped to alter the political process, they would more likely have targeted Armenian President Robert Kocharian. He was the main negotiator in the recent talks on Nagorno-Karabakh. Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian had actually been in support of Nagorno independence, as was evidenced by his leading the volunteer army that fought there and his term as president of the region.
Georgian-Russian relations have fared much worse due to the Chechen issue. The two are engaged in a political confrontation over Russia�s campaign in Chechnya. Russia claims Georgia is allowing Chechen arms smuggling and the flow of Chechen rebels across its border. Georgia stated it would not close its border to Chechen refugees. Also, Russia has amassed a huge amount of military equipment on the southern rim of the North Caucasus, which is in violation of the Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty. At the November OSCE summit, Georgia is expected to insist that Russia adhere to the treaty�s prescribed provisions.
Considering Russia�s tense relations with the rest of the region, Armenia is of central strategic importance to Russia. The hostage situation in Yerevan may give Russia the excuse it needs to move heavy power into Armenia. If Armenia invites Russian intervention either to resolve the hostage situation or to secure political stability after the crisis ends, Russia can fall back on its historic tradition of exploiting a crisis to usurp power.
All Russia needs is for its strategic partner, Armenia, to ask for its help � unless it decides to fabricate its own excuse and act unilaterally. Russia will find a way to increase its cooperation with the Armenian government, and could potentially have significant influence, in light of the political chaos that will inevitably follow the numerous assassinations. Also, Russia can increase its military force in the region, giving it the leverage to have more influence.
There are two impediments to Russia�s involvement. First, Armenia is already closely allied with Russia, but is an independent nation that does not desire a permanent Russian presence, which Armenia�s leadership must realize would ensue if Russia moved in. Second, Russia�s forces are already spread thinly and would be hard pressed to find the resources necessary to pull together an influential amount of power.
Regardless of these obstacles, Russia will do what it can to turn out the winner in the end. If Russia takes the opportunity to assert more control in Armenia � either by invitation or design � Russian power in the Caucasus could be significantly increased, completely swaying the regional balance of power.
Valery BABERDIN, OCT 28
(Interfax)
The Proton rocket, which recently was considered as one of the safer ones in the world, began to have some problems. From 1965 to mid 1999 262 rockets of this sort were launched, including one failure. The accident on September 27 launched from Baikonur (three months after from the accident on July 5) proved that the situation is inherent in the system, taking into consideration that the accidents had similar scenario.
The national space industry faces problems for some years. Workers at plants have not receive salaries for several years. Highly qualified personnel leaves the branch, while young specialists are rare in space companies. We launch only some our own satellites. At one of the meetings the general director of the Russian Space Agency Yuryi Koptev reminded listeners that the volume of state orders for space technology with scientific, social-economic and defence purposes had been reduced 14 times in comparison with 1989-1991.
The actual budget for the rocket-space operation in Russia comes to US$ 200 to 220 million. In 1998 India spent US$ 300 million to this activity, the European Space Agency � US$ 3 billion, Japan � US$ 2 billion, USA � US$ 27 billion. Naturally, the economic crisis, financing problems at enterprises influence both the production and standard of the operations. Due to departure of experienced personnel, traditions are being lost, and the school is being damaged.
The report of the state commission that investigated the reason for the accident of the rocket Proton on July 5 stated: at the 277th second of the flight one of the engines of the second step broke due to a rare production defect � non-qualitative welding of the turbo-jet cover. Due to a constructive and technological peculiarity of the unit this joint could not be checked by spectrography. The general designer of the Khrunichev�s Space Centre Anatoly Kiselyov announced that the Centre had planned to modernise the second-phase engines of Proton. The works were supposed to be done by specialists from Himavtomatika (Voronezh). It was planned to allot money for these works in 2000, but after the accident it should have been done in 1999.
Himavtomatika faces its own problems. Its administration has to take survival measures, as the enterprise has been declared bankrupt. Meanwhile, 12 rockets of this sort were kept at the moment of the accident on July 5. According to experts, customers were persuaded that these rockets could be launched after additional control and tests to be conducted right at the space-vehicle launch site.
In September two satellites launches by Protons succeeded. On October 27 an accident similar to first one took place. Approximately at 220th second of the flight, there was an explosion, when the second-phase engines were working. Russia lost Express-A1, a satellite of the new generation which was supposed to work in orbit for 10 years. The international organisation �Intersputnik�, TV companies NTV, TV-6, regional TV channels as well as the National Russian Tele-Radio Company intended to use the satellite.
Kazakhstan banned new launches of Protons. According to specialists� prognoses, this prohibition, which is the second this year will not be long. Probably, the Indonesian company ACeS which ordered the launch of Garuda satellite on November 16 will withdraw from the Centre�s services and choose another rocket, e.g. the European Arian.
Other contracts and launches (value of each of them is US$ 80 to 90 million) are questionable. Besides, the most serious start of Proton, launching of the service module for the International Space Station was to December-January. There are some other unfavourable consequences of the accident. Russia possesses 13 orbital positions for telecommunication satellites inn the geostationary orbit. Only three positions have been occupied by space devices. According to the requirements of the International Electronic Communication Union, if Russia does not occupy the announced positions till November 2000, it will lose them.
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