August 23 (Stratfor)
SUMMARY
The appointment of Vladimir Putin appears to be another of an endless round of random appointments by Boris Yeltsin. We think it is of greater, more lasting significance. Putin, a lifetime operative for the KGB, currently sits on top of Russia’s intelligence apparatus. Unlike the other Yeltsin appointees, he has an institutional base with a distinct, sophisticated agenda. Given the converging crises inside of Russia and Yeltsin’s inability to control the situation, we see the appointment of Putin as part of an attempt by the intelligence and defense communities to arrest and reverse the catastrophic slide of Russia into the abyss. Putin may or may not succeed. He has enormous opposition and problems. But his appointment is moving Russia to a different place.
ANALYSIS
On August 9, 1999, Boris Yeltsin fired Sergei Stepashin, his prime minister of a few short months, and replaced him with Vladimir Putin, head of the renamed KGB (the FSB) and of the State Security Council. Putin is the latest of a string of prime ministers appointed by Yeltsin, none of whom lasted more than a few months. The obvious question is whether this latest firing and appointment has any real significance or whether, in the words of Yuri Luzhkov, Moscow’s mayor and contender for national power, this represented the “continuous, nonstop absurdity of those in power.” Or, as Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister and power broker put it: “It is hard to explain madness.”
There are two competing explanations for what is going on in Moscow. One is that, in the words of Macbeth, “It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing.” Yeltsin is an old, confused alcoholic, and nothing is happening but his random whims. Then there is the other explanation, which we subscribe to, that there is in fact meaning behind the political maneuverings: a struggle for the soul of Russia between two insufficiently defined factions, with a third, darker force waiting in the wings. This view is not in any way incompatible with the notion that Yeltsin is not in control of his faculties, although we very much doubt that this is true. Nor is it incompatible with the idea that there are many other more personal and private issues involved. History is rarely clear cut. Nevertheless, it is our view that the emergence of Vladimir Putin represents a breakpoint in recent Russian history and may well be a defining moment.
Putin’s appointment is not like the appointment of his predecessors. Putin is a different personality who comes directly from the intelligence community. He has his own bureaucratic power base, and that power base has its own agenda. We believe that agenda is increasingly divergent from Yeltsin’s and his backers and followers. Indeed, it is our view that the appointment of Putin is not simply a new, random action by Yeltsin, as much as it is an attempt by the intelligence-defense community in Russia to gain control of a badly deteriorating situation. It is not clear to us, in fact, whether Yeltsin selected Putin or whether Putin was forced on Yeltsin.
It is, of course, becoming increasingly difficult to figure out what is happening in the Kremlin. In the old days of communism, Kremlinologists, as they were called, worked with the merest scraps of information trying to figure out who was rising and falling in power. A politician missing from an official picture, a casual comment from an apparently drunken diplomat, the wording of a party proclamation – these were the bare indicators Kremlinologists worked with, trying to figure out who was in, who was out and why. It has not quite become that bad, but it has gone a long way in that direction. Over the past year or so, the Russian political system has been losing transparency. The constitutional arrangements have evolved in such a way that the Duma, for all its bellowing, ultimately rubber stamps Yeltsin’s selections. Decisions on who rises and falls are announced by Yeltsin, but the fact is that a complex and extremely opaque political process has emerged behind the Russian presidency, involving a complex interplay of individuals, groups and social forces. We see the outcome of the struggles among these forces as officials rise and fall. We focus on Yeltsin since he is both the president and the announcer of the winners and losers. It can therefore appear that Yeltsin is simply and arbitrarily in control. We think this appearance is an optical illusion. Stepashin said in an interview a few days after he was fired that he thought that Yeltsin was forced to dismiss him, because he “refused to serve the interest of certain groups, which made them realize [he] wasn’t pliable.” He went on to say that Yeltsin was not alone in his office when he fired Stepashin, although he did not say who else was there. We are returning to the politics of conspiracy. The very difficulty of figuring out what is going on inside the Kremlin speaks volumes about the state of democracy in Russia.
As we said, there are two factions competing for power inside the Kremlin, with another waiting outside the walls. The first faction, the faction that has dominated Russia since the fall of Gorbachev, is the Russia of the extreme reformists and Westernizers. Their intention was to transform Russia into a constitutional democracy with a functioning market economy. For them, the very existence of the Soviet Union was an encumbrance, forcing the more developed regions of Russia to stop and wait for the less developed ones. Intimately linked to Western academics and bankers, this revolutionary faction intended to transform Russia into a modern European state.
The extreme reformists and Westernizers failed. Russia used to be poor but powerful. Today Russia is much poorer and much less powerful. At the heart of the reformist failure was Russia’s deeply embedded inefficiency and the faction’s own corruption. Money invested in Russia did not turn into capital. It did not generate more production, but was simply soaked up in consumption and corruption. In the face of Russia’s resistance to effective structural change, the reformers turned into thieves. Vast amounts of Western investment and aid was stolen by leading reformers, moved out of Russia and invested in the West. The breathtaking extent of this thievery is only now being calculated with some precision, although the order of magnitude has been known for a long time.
The second faction might be called Gorbachev’s heirs, of whom Putin is a prime specimen. Putin has spent his career in the state security apparatus. He rose from a KGB field operative in Germany to the head of the renamed KGB. Contrary to the popular view of the KGB as mindlessly brutal, the KGB’s cadre was probably the most educated, well-traveled and sophisticated social group in the old Soviet Union. By the very nature of their jobs, they were forced to confront the degree to which the Soviet Union was falling behind the West technologically and economically. As guarantors of the regime inside the Soviet Union, they knew better than anyone the levels of inefficiency, corruption and cynicism that had gripped the Soviet Union. Along with their counterparts in the upper reaches of the military, they understood how much trouble the Soviet Union was in long before Western experts got a sense of it.
Gorbachev was very much their invention. Gorbachev’s mission was to reform the Soviet Union, not dismantle it. Gorbachev understood that the old Stalinist model of central planning had to be replaced by market mechanisms. He also understood that intellectual liberalization was necessary in order to increase economic efficiency. Finally, Gorbachev understood that Western investment and technology transfer were essential if the Soviet Union was to become competitive. It followed from this that the Cold War had to be ended if the West was to be induced to invest in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev tried to negotiate an armistice that would leave the Soviet Union in a position of equality with the West.
What Gorbachev never intended happened. Relieving pressure on the system meant that the centrifugal forces within the Soviet Union took over, shredding it along many lines. Soviet institutions were torn apart. The Gorbachevites tacked with the wind, attaching themselves to various reform factions. The key thrust of the Gorbachevites – the radical reform of the economy and Soviet society – was also the position of Yeltsin and the reformers, albeit with a Russian focus and an even more radical bent. This was not intolerable to the Gorbachevites. The subordination of Russian national interests to the West followed even from Gorbachev’s own strategy of détente in exchange for investment. Men like Putin could live within the dynamics of Yeltsin’s Russia. Indeed, they would have disappeared invisibly into a reformed Russia had everything not gone disastrously wrong.
In all of this, one institution remained relatively intact: the KGB, now renamed the FSB in a purely cosmetic shift. The FSB was genuinely committed to reform because of its obsession with national security. The same impulse toward national security caused the FSB to maintain its old internal and external infrastructure. The FSB did not dismantle the KGB’s infrastructure. It put parts of it on hold, parts of it in the deep freeze and continued operating other parts of it. But all of the structure continued to exist. The KGB, as the leading reformist faction within the Soviet Union, collaborated comfortably with the new reformers, both in their legitimate and illegitimate activities. But in the final analysis, while they shared much with the reformers, they differed in one fundamental way: they were Soviet men. They believed, if not in the ideology of the Soviet Union, then in its imperial mission. Their tentacles ran throughout the former Soviet Union and into Eastern Europe as well. So long as reform held out the promise of a greater Russia, they were prepared to give their loyalty to the reformers. But there were limits.
Three limits were hit within a short period of time:
1. Kosovo: When Kiriyenko was fired and replaced by Primakov, another KGB man, Stratfor was able to predict the Kosovo crisis. It was our view that Primakov would take Russia on a more assertive course in relation to the West, and as a result, the Serbs would be encouraged to take greater risks than they had before. When Primakov was overthrown in the middle of the war, Serbia’s geopolitical position collapsed. Russia essentially abandoned Serbia under Chernomyrdin’s and Stepashin’s hands, forcing Milosevic to capitulate. There was a major crisis at the time, including the Pristina airport affair. Stepashin survived, but the sense of humiliation ran deep in both the military and the FSB. Most important, it was not clear that Russia was receiving anything of value in return for its services in Kosovo.
It is known that disputes regarding water, territorial problems and the Islamic factor which are observed in Central Asia, make many analysts talk about the security problem in this region. In May a famous American politician supposed that there would be the second Yugoslavia in Central Asia. Today THE GLOBE proposes you thoughts of the correspondent of the Kazakh Service of Radio “Liberty” (KSRL) devoted to this problem.
The parliamentary election is approaching. The pre-election campaign is getting active. Radio “Liberty” held a round table to learn the opinion of some well-known people regarding the pre-election Marathon.
In one of his interviews to KSRL, the famous American politician Bzezhinsky stated that the future war between Central Asian countries was possible, and there could appear the second Yugoslavia in that territory. How much is this prognosis grounded taking into consideration the today’s situation?
It is known that in 1970-s, during the golden age of the Soviet Union, the same politician made a prognosis regarding the country’s future and predicted the break-up. But, may he be mistaken this time? It is obvious that territorial disputes and division of water spaces may be the ground for conflicts in Central Asian region. But the common people can never take weapon without any reason, having thrown their working tools. Usually conflicts are initiated by a wrong policy, international religious extremist groups and terrorism.
Now we may say, the Central Asia is covered by a war shadow. This is proved by the events in Kyrgyzstan, when about 300 to 400 terrorists invaded from Tajikistan and having seized hostages captured 4 villages. This story started on July 30, when terrorists appeared in Batkensky region. Once the Kyrgyzs were forced out from fertile soils, which were given to their neighbours. It seems that Tajik terrorists brought sparks of war having appeared in namely those regions of the republic, which may give cause to conflicts. Uzbekistan immediately sent its troops as a support in order to save its lands.
Kyrgyz frontier troops held a landing force of 200 persons, but the Kyrgyz authorities knew that they would not be able to manage terrorists, due to which the help of Uzbek air forces was quite necessary. The Uzbek aviation threw bombs on Tajik bordering settlements, however, there was the information that these bombs stroke Kyrgyz settlements in Tajikistan. Kyrgyzs living in Kyrgyzstan were indignant at this. At the present time Uzbekistan closed all borders and does not let Kyrgyzs who want to go to their own country via the Uzbek territory, enter.
That is why the situation in bordering Uzbek and Kyrgyz regions is very difficult. This conflict goes back to old disputes regarding land and water. The trade turnover between the tow countries has been significantly reduced. Uzbekistan doe not let a single Kyrgyz vehicle pass through its customs posts. Besides, the local population is badly informed about the last events, as they learn many things from rumours distributed in the region.
The Uzbek the Minister of Foreign Affairs refuted all information about the Uzbek landing force’s bombing of settlements. He stated that they had bombed Tajik troops in accordance with the request of the Kyrgyz government. The Kyrgyzs think in an opposite way: namely, that the Uzbeks want to liquidate Kyrgyzs under the pretence of a struggle against terrorists. Terrorists, who wish to penetrate to the neighbouring country via another country, have reopened old wounds.
During the most serious moments, when bloody events started, many people saw that the Kyrgyz military forces were unable to find a way out. For example, the chairman of CNS was unexpectedly ill, the Minister of Defence was dismissed, while the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was captured as a hostage.
28.08.99
Another period of the pre-election battles is coming to the end. In few days the pre-election agitation will start. In connection with this, the KSRL correspondent held a round table to learn the opinion of some citizens of the republic regarding the pre-election Marathon. The participants of this round table were as follows: the chairman of the Almaty regional and city committee of Working Movement Utegen Kabaziev, a representative of RPPK Kopbosyn Tanzabek, an independent journalist Zhumash Kenebai, and Karishal Asanaov, a self-nominator to the Mazhilis deputies.
Zhumash Kenebai: the pre-election campaign was in its most active phase. It is obvious from different mass media that the furious struggle for deputies’ sits has started between former deputies, functionaries, ministers and akims. Hence, despite the gained sovereignty and announced democracy, our country is living according to instructions of the high ranks. Obviously, ‘former’ bureaucrats do not want to leave their soft armchairs.
Utegen Kabaziev: Working Movement has been also completely involved into the pre-election agitation. Watching “Otan” and RPPK working, we still follow our policy. We support the platform of the Communist Party, though we have refuted to join them. We do not support RPPK, as their leaders criticised Kazakhstan at the US congress. We believe that this is absolutely wrong. We should struggle against this right in the republic, but not somewhere abroad.
Kopbosyn Tanzabek Yes, the pre-election work has started, but nobody knows how the election (either Presidential or other ones) will end, as the are always held infringing the laws. No elections were held in our country in accordance with the main law. Deputies are not to be elected from the number of former functionaries or businessmen. As a rule, they think only about their own wealth and power. New people, who will really be elected by the people, are to enter the Parliament.
Karishal Asanov: I am surprised, when the President says that we are not to vote for corrupted and grasping people. In fact we have the opposite results, as people who once were either in the government or in other powerful structures, for example, Karamanov, Baizhanov, the prosecutor Tuyakbaev. We should elect representatives of people, who know perfectly well people’s requirements and are ready to defend people’s interests.
Zh. K.: As far as parties’ lists are concerned, we should say that people nominated by “Otan” party loyal to the authorities, have both power and money, and their chances are higher. I cannot believe that these people will try to improve people’s condition and will do anything useful for them. Of course, it is hopeful that candidates of the opposition have been nominated along with these people. The opposition’s candidates will probably be able to justify the population’s hopes. If such former deputies of the Parliament as Kudaibergen Sultanbaev and Uzakbai Karamanov, probably these persons have no consciousness, as the former Parliament’s work was bad.
K.T.: Many former functionaries, who are going to be nominated, have never though either about people’s condition or situation in the country. What can we expect from them further? They have the only aim: to live well owing to taxpayers’ money and to leave their posts with a good pension. Now the population is hungry, being poor, and it will vote for new, young and fresh forces, having believed in their readiness to help the people. But who knows? It may happen that again bulletins will be falsified and these forces will not enter the Parliament.
29.08.99
THE GLOBE, basing on materials of the Kazakh Service of Radio “Liberty”
All Over the Globe is published by IPA House.
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