Bakhytzhamal Bekturganova
President of the Association of Political and Social Scientists
Almaty
The first decade of February
Number of respondents - 528
Instead of Introduction
� What illegal actions do you face most frequently? - �Hard to answer� (24.3%)
� Which means of public influence upon the governmental and local authorities are the acceptable for you? -�Hard to answer� (7.3%)
� What major democracy norms are provided by the state? - �Hard to answer�
�Hard to answer� is the negative product of all the respondents� replies? Though its total percentage in the answer structure differs, depending upon the question specific? The more the reality corresponds to the respondents� expectations, the more significant is the �internal immigration� process. What does this percentage indicate? The urban population�s demoralization or the loss of any inclinations to share their opinion ie social passivity? Let�s think it over together.
Everything is painful in the illegitimate state
What does our Constitution say?- that Kazakhstan is building a legal state. The imperative of the legal state is the equality of all its citizens before the law.
What does our reality say?- that the law serves the state, which is likely to abuse it absolutely legally.
Further comparison creates the rhetorical question: would the law-abiding citizen be albe to avoid legal problems, if he did business in the way in which the government manages the national property?
The activity of two zealous financiers, distracted by an idea over the 8 years of reforms, was so deterimental to the state coffers of Kazakhstan, that it became very hard to control corruption.
What illegal actions do you face most frequently?
1. Hard to answer | 23.4 |
2. Wild racket (theft, moral offence etc) | 14.3 |
3. Illegal actions of the law-enforcement bodies | 12.0 |
4. State official corruption and abuse of power | 11.4 |
5. Apartment owner property right abuse by Apartment Owner Cooperatives | 11.4 |
6. Company official abuse of power | 10.3 |
7. Constitutional right violations by local authorities | 6.3 |
8. Corruption and injustice of court institutions | 5.1 |
9. Others | 4.0 |
10. Organized crimes | 1.7 |
In the �others � the respondents voluntary mentioned:
- Governmental corruption through state property transactions (privatization vouchers)
- Road police corruption
- Pension payment delays
- Corruption and bribery in the higher education institutions.
(Only the most frequent answers quoted).
Our society suffers through different kind social pathologies. In the country, where ordinary citizens depend on the non-law-abiding state, they cannot protect themselves from the governmental violations.
Which methods of public influence upon the governmental and local authorities are the acceptable for you? (%, column)
1. Appellation to authorities through the mass media (TV, radio, press) | 23.7 |
2. Everything is useless in the non-law-abiding state | 22.0 |
3. Court appellation against officials� power abuses | 11.3 |
4. Messages to authorities | 10.2 |
5. Trade union activation and protective function enhancement | 7.9 |
6. Meetings, manifestations, strikes | 6.2 |
7. Establishment of professional lobbies to protect interests | 4.5 |
8. Military protest actions | 3.4 |
9. Hunger strikes | 1.1 |
10. Party movement participation | 0.6 |
11. Others | 1.7 |
12. Hard to answer | 7.3 |
The �others� column indicated the following peculiar responds:
- �all the possible channels likely to influence are blocked�
- �bureaucrats are bureaucrats�
Most of the respondents prefer the comprised authority influence to civil disobedience methods.
The low protest potential of the Almaty respondents however is not evidence of their public opinion depolitization. The power non-satisfaction expression and the readiness to influence it for self-protection is also a political act.
Anything said is about democracy.
Anything done, does not approach it.
Talking about democracy used to be a good tone. But talking is useless and its time to make things happen. What is to be done? The country�s democracy indicator is the public opinion about it.
What major democracy norms are provided by the state? (%, column)
1. No democratic society norm is observed | 38.2 |
2. Hard to answer | 25.7 |
3. General order and personal security | 7.9 |
4. Political choice freedom | 7.2 |
5. Political opponent tolerance | 7.2 |
6. All citizens equality | 5.3 |
7. Glasnost and word freedom | 3.9 |
8. Others | 2.0 |
9. Human rights | 1.3 |
10. Social and economic guarantees | 1.3 |
The �others� column suggests:
- Declarative freedom, no political activity freedom�
- Pay lip service about Kazakhstan�s democracy, striving for international public image
- Empty fridge result.
- The rich get richer, the poor get poorer.
Instead of conclusion:
�If you come across the ancient age institution with the old order despite any time requirements, or some non-sense innovation, try to find out the reason of this evil thing: You will find the occasional and extreme financial measure, referred to the institution; You would find new authorities, created for the one-day tax payment purposes, and which would exist for centuries�. (A. Tokvil. Old order and revolution, 1986, p 120).
Who now takes responsibility for abandoned villages, dead social services, the economic crisis, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor.
V.S.
Irina SAVOSTINA, Oksana LIGAY
ALMATY, February 18 (Specially for THE GLOBE)
In transformation period, Kazakhstan became a testing ground for economic reforms just as it with its Semipalatinsk�s steppes had until recently been a nuclear testing ground. Now we are being probed by a new pension reform. It was modeled after the Chilean pattern but only few people, even those who shaped it, knew exactly what it meant.
As for the Chilean version, it ought to be noted that the Chilean - after bombing the presidential palace and executions of Aliende�s supporters - did not rush to move their country�s wealth to foreign banks but invested their money in domestic production.
Darrell Brown and Mitchell Wienner, American consultants for the Kazakhstani pension reform, were absolutely ignorant of the local population�s mentality and of the state of affairs with the Social Care in Kazakhstan. In 1997, early December, they informed �Pokolenie� that positive results of the reform would be obvious only in 17 years. According to Mr. Wienner, the cost of the reform made up some 1% of the country�s GDP. Were the reform not started in 1997, the pensioners would have now not T20 billion but more than T80 billion.