(Continued from # 79(397))
Oct11 (Stratfor)
After the cold war USA have been developing the new strategy. The system, in which it was supposed to settle strategic problems supporting prosperity of both Russia and China, has failed.
Eurasia became unstable, while Russia and China are trying to retain the centre. These two countries present different problems. If they manage to hold the political unity, they will form a serious regional problem in their periphery. In case of their divergence, they may either threaten US interests within their borders or give the United States to widen the zone of their influence.
The Balance Forces Strategy, which will impart other countries, especially Germany and Japan with a more decisive role, will appear in USA.
The relative performances of the American alliance compared to the Soviet alliance showed this inequality, quite apart from the inherent inefficiencies of communism.
The grand strategy of the United States after the fall of communism was the integration of both the former Soviet Union and China into its global economic system, coupled with alliance based ad hoc interventions. The premise was that if the former Soviets and Chinese participated in the international economic system forged during the Cold War, they would inevitably prosper. If they prospered, they would have no interest or need to engage in geopolitical exercises.
There were two problems with this analysis. First, Russia�s inclusion into the Western financial system triggered a massive depression rather than an economic boom. Second, the general Asian economic meltdown not only dragged down China, but magnified the pernicious effects of a communist system that had not been dismantled. Forgotten in the core strategy was that (a) capitalism hurts, particularly in its early stages, (b) capitalism has down as well as up cycles and (c) capitalism requires a political system sufficiently mature to survive through bad times. As a result, the post-Cold War strategy of the United States is now in shambles.
The attempt by the United States to extend Cold War institutions to the post-Cold War world has reached its limits. A new strategy is needed. There are clear foundations for that strategy. The United States fought World War I, World War II and the Cold War with a single goal in mind: to prevent the unification of Eurasia under any single power. The logic was simple: if any single power could marshal Eurasia�s resources, the global balance of power would tilt dramatically against the United States. U.S. maritime security could no longer be guaranteed. Therefore, when it became apparent in the two world wars that Germany might well dominate all of Eurasia by itself or in alliance with Japan, the U.S. intervened, albeit at the latest moment possible. During the Cold War, the U.S. intervened from the beginning, having taken away the lesson from World War II that Europe could not maintain its balance of power by itself, and that late intervention by the United States increased the cost to the United States, along with the risk.
Things are very different now. There is no threat of a single Eurasian hegemon. Russia has its hands full recovering what it has lost. China, even without its own stability problems, has nowhere to expand � unless it wants to challenge Russian power in the Central Asian states, whose governments oppose an alliance with Russia. It has limited naval power, since the Himalayas block it in the southwest and Siberia is not particularly appetizing. Instead, China and Russia will pose problems along their peripheries. They do not pose a challenge to Eurasia as a whole and therefore do not threaten the global system dominated by the United States.
In this context, the United States has three strategic options:
� Attempt a strategy of destabilization designed to fragment Russia and China even more;
� Follow a strategy of containment in which the United States responds to regional threats from Russia and China through direct military intervention;
� Follow a balance-of-power strategy in which nations indigenous to the region deal with regional threats from Russia and China.
The United States will not follow the first option. This would require more effort and thought than the U.S. political elite is currently capable of exerting on foreign policy. Second, and much more important, Russia and China are massive entities. They move along on their own trajectories. No outside power has the mass to shift those trajectories. No outside power has the ability to shape Russian and Chinese history. At most, the outside world can exert some limited influence.
This leaves a choice between active containment and balance-of-power strategies. The United States during the past 10 years has become addicted to direct interventions. However, these have been against small, isolated countries. The risk of casualties and escalation has been limited, and the United States has been accompanied by allies. The United States is risk- and casualty-averse. Blocking Russian interests in Lithuania or Chinese interests in the Straits of Formosa might involve serious risk. This is not Haiti.
More important, the United States does not have the needed resources. The United States declined a heavy involvement in East Timor precisely for this reason. Major ground interventions against large military powers that can reinforce themselves, even if with inferior equipment and low morale, is another matter. The simple fact is that land-based intervention in Eurasia is not possible on an ongoing basis without a huge mobilization. The strategic interests of the United States simply do not justify that mobilization.
That leaves the United States with one strategy: allowing the balance of power to maintain itself. This strategy achieves the fundamental U.S. interest, which is preventing the unification of Eurasia. Rather than constantly deploying U.S. forces in response to events outside U.S. control, it reserves those forces in the event the Eurasian balance of power cannot be maintained. The United States can then commit forces in a concentrated and decisive manner, rather than in piecemeal interventions with limited, nonstrategic goals.
This is a strategy that forces Europeans to deal with European problems, and Asians with Asian problems. It holds the door open to U.S. intervention as U.S. interests dictate, without compelling the United States to act reflexively. Europe and Asia will have to develop leadership capable of carrying out the mission. If the United States stops intervening, that leadership will inevitably emerge, just as it will never emerge while the United States absorbs the risks and the burdens. As the U.S. propensity for risk taking declines, regional powers will emerge. The two obvious powers: Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia.
And that�s where this strategy gets dicey. The balance-of-power strategy is the most rational course the United States can follow over the next 10-20 years. But it is a strategy that is predicated on the re-emergence of Germany and Japan as regional powers leading regional economic, political and above all, military systems designed to control events in their regions. There is no question but that Germany and Japan have the resources. There is also no question but that each is reluctant to undertake the role. Nor is there any question but that their neighbors would be appalled at the prospect. But that is their neighbors� problem and their own. It is not an American problem. There is no question but that in danger � which we see rapidly approaching � each will be forced to undertake the revolution in domestic politics necessary to protect its national interests. Their neighbors will be forced to live with it.
The question is not whether the U.S. should or should not permit this to happen. We think it is inevitable. The United States is not in a position, politically or strategically, to support force levels that will allow it to guarantee Lithuanian independence and Indonesian stability. That is simply not an option. As the crescent of instability surrounding Russia and China spreads and intensifies, the United States lacks the force to control events and the interest to take the risks. Nations in the region do have the interest and the resources. They will have to develop the power.
The United States has three great interests. First, to maintain and extend its technological lead over other countries while sustaining the unprecedented growth of its economy. Second, to maintain the U.S. Navy�s control over the world�s oceans so that no power can project forces against North America. Finally, to maintain U.S. control of space so that U.S. intelligence permits early warnings of threats and so that U.S. aerospace power can be targeted as necessary. These are three mutually supporting interests. Patrolling the frontiers of the Russian and Chinese empires is not part of this cluster of interests, except as they intersect other interests, such as sea-lane control.
The problem at hand is the management of an increasingly dangerous situation in Eurasia without undue exposure to risks. The United States will back off from managing regional risks in Eurasia, because the domestic politics of the United States will not tolerate it and because the United States lacks the resources needed for ongoing power projection on the scale required. The Europeans and Asians will move into the gap. The United States will not disappear from the global scene by any means. American fleets will still patrol the oceans; American satellites will still monitor the world. But we expect the balance of power in Eurasia proper to be maintained by regional powers and not the United States.
Remember always that we are talking about the United States. Strategy will not be clearly debated or enunciated. It will simply unfold over time. We can already see it unfolding in the silences of the presidential campaigns, in the things that are left unsaid by the major candidates. The United States does not stage coherent foreign policy debates. It prefers to ignore the issues or shout them as simplistic slogans: Isolationist vs. Internationalist, Hawk vs. Dove. Shows like Crossfire offer two opposing viewpoints, rather than the finely nuanced thinking required for serious strategy. Yet remarkably, in spite of all of this, the United States has historically generated coherent, powerful and effective foreign policies. How this happens is a story in itself and not a simple one. That it happens is historically obvious.
Shifts happen. One is starting to take place now. It will take awhile to show itself and longer still to be recognized as a shift. But once in place it will last for a long time and have profound consequences that will resonate throughout the 21st century.
Oct 14 (Stratfor)
The removal of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif leaves China in a stronger position in Pakistan and the region than the United States. While the United States was aware of the growing dissatisfaction with Sharif�s policies in Pakistan, it continued to back him as a diplomatic tool. Following the conflict in Kashmir earlier this year, Sharif became an apparently willing extension of U.S. efforts to capture Osama bin Laden. As Pakistan was traditionally a strong supporter of the Taliban, Sharif could bring serious pressure to bear on the group in regard to bin Laden.
However, using Sharif was always a risk for the United States, as his cooperation was based on domestic weakness. While the United States still holds an economic card in dealing with Pakistan, with Sharif gone, it no longer has the upper hand. The new regime will come to power in the midst of national public support for the actions of the military against Sharif, and will not need to depend on the United States to maintain its power.
The United States� loss appears to be China�s gain. China strongly opposed Sharif�s actions in Kashmir this year. This, added to Sharif�s apparent shift into the American camp and general unreliability, led to a deterioration of relations between China and Pakistan. However, with Sharif out, and the United States even less likely than before the coup to re-establish military ties with Pakistan in the near future, China can gain more influence in Pakistan through increased military cooperation. And with an increased Chinese hand in Pakistan, the United States will try to counter Chinese moves, placing Pakistan back in a firm negotiating position.
WASHINGTON, Oct 12 (AFP)
The spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the army is among key factors that drove the Pakistan military to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, according to analysts.
Concern about the plight of the economy and the desire for a tougher stand against South Asian neighbor India were also high on the list of issues that prompted Pakistan�s military chief Pervez Musharraf to launch a coup, they said.
�It has been a �Talibanisation� within the army and even within the entire society,� said Deepa Ollapally, senior expert on South Asian affairs at the US Institute of Peace here.
Ollapally was referring to growing support in Pakistan for the Taliban militia, a fundamentalist group that controls much of neighboring Afghanistan.
�The worst case scenario would be that the military is going to present a face much more militant and much more Islamic, to gain credibility and to gain legitimacy,� she said.
Vidyaamali Samarasinghe, a specialist in international relations of Asia at the American University, said Islamisation of the army was well-advanced.
�Islamic fundamentalist groups are so powerful in the army,� she said
Teresita Schaffer, a South Asia specialist at Washington�s Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the key to the unfolding events in Pakistan is �what role the Islamic right will take on in the coming days.�
�Whether Sharia (Islamic law) takes on more importance it will be a worrying development which cannot be excluded at this stage,� she said.
Shirin Tahir-Khely, of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute here said �Talibanisation is potentially real.�
She said Islamic fundamentalists have always had supporters in Pakistan.
�What has been different is that the political institutions have encouraged this,� Tahir-Khely said. �It�s become very respectable.�
She cited �exposure of the army to the fundamentalism,� but also the fact that Western influence has perhaps diminished.
�For the first time ever, you have an army chief of staff who has never been educated in the West, in the US military schools, like the previous ones,� she said, referring to General Pervez Musharraf, whose dismissal as head of the military prompted him to take action against Sharif.
Sharif�s decision to withdraw his forces from the recent border clash with India has also deeply upset military leaders.
Pakistan and India fought a 10-week conflict earlier this year after Islamic guerrillas occupied key peaks on the Indian side of the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir.
The conflict brought the world�s two newest nuclear powers to the brink of their fourth war.
�For the first time there are splits in the army,� said Ollapally. �Sections within the army support Nawaz, sections, bigger, don�t support him. These sections want to go further with the conflict with India and want a stronger policy against India.�
Pakistan�s dire economic plight has also kindled opposition to Sharif in the military.
�The economy continues to collapse, political institutions continue to collapse. It�s a breakdown of law and order,� said Tahir-Khelys.
Oct 14 (Stratfor)
The military�s removal of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif raises questions of Pakistan�s relations with its neighbors and allies, in particular India and the United States. For India, any sudden shift of power in Pakistan threatens to disrupt the tenuous peace along the shared Kashmir border. Following the early signs of moves by the Pakistani military today, India ordered its troops in Kashmir on high alert. However, while the military in Pakistan has at least temporary control, it is not likely that the current regime shift will result in a resumption of hostilities with India. It may instead lead to a more stable Pakistan.
The clashes this spring between India and Pakistan in Kashmir led to an interesting shift in international attitudes toward the two South Asian nations. Despite frequent denials, Pakistan was seen as the aggressor, backing Muslim militants who held positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC). Traditional backers of Pakistan, including China and the United States, took a hard-line approach against Pakistan in the conflict, suggesting that maintaining regional stability took precedence over traditional alliances.
Pressure from the United States led to Sharif�s call for the militants� withdrawal from Indian controlled Kashmir, a move that seriously weakened Sharif�s standing in Pakistan. Since July, Sharif has been shuttling between factions in Pakistan in an attempt to shore up power, but in doing so only further alienated himself from any supporters. The greater instability of Sharif�s government following the Kashmir crisis has been further augmented by consistent rumors of planned coups. The weakened condition of the Pakistani government was in itself a threat to regional stability.
The chance of an accidental renewal of conflict with India decreases with the military takeover of power and removal of Sharif. The Pakistani military realizes the fundamental difference in size and strength between Pakistan and India and has little desire to go to war with India over Kashmir. The Pakistani military will defend its interests, but it will not make an aggressive move at this time. This means, in the short term, India must wait to see who will take power in Pakistan; in the longer term, the added stability will decrease the chances for a cross-border action.
The United States has taken an extremely cautious approach to the moves in Pakistan. The United States is not likely to take drastic steps against the new regime, though it has made made clear it does not condone a military coup and has called for a swift return to a democratic government. The strategic importance of Pakistan in South Asian stability necessitates continued U.S. involvement. In addition, Pakistan�s recent standing as a nuclear power also influences continued U.S. cooperation with Pakistan.
Internally, the military is playing to nationalistic sentiments, declaring Gen. Pervez Musharraf a hero of the Kargil conflict in news reports. In Musharraf�s speech to the nation, he stated clearly that military actions were made to stabilize Pakistan. While in the short term there will be confusion and tension as neighbors and allies of Pakistan await news of the shape of the new regime, Sharif�s removal appears to offer the prospect of a more stable government.
Analysts have been talking for a long time that the government of Navaz Sharif is losing the power, which is being transferred to the army and special services. The analysts connect this with Islam movement namely and in particular � with the Taliban movement. We propose you a part of the article �Battle of bold man for a brush� by Natalya Yefimova from �Expert� magazine. This article was published in THE GLOBE dated 06.07.99. The author writes about possible transformation of the Indo-Pakistani conflict into a local nuclear war.
Natalya YEFIMOVA (�Expert� # 23)
The same Talibs
The condition of the Pakistani economy is more difficult than of the Indian one. The foreign debt of Pakistan exceeds US$ 32 billion. Islamabad has to spend more than 90% of the budget means to serve the external debts, defence and maintenance of the state administration. The remaining means are catastrophically insufficient to finance social programs, due to which Pakistan has become one of the poorest countries in the world. (By the way, that is why, some Indian strategists recommend their government not to hasten direct military operations, but to start a new armament race, which, in their opinion, will completely ruin Pakistan).
Many commentators believe that Navaz Sharif�s government is losing the power, as the latter is being transferred to the army and special services. Generals seem unsatisfied with efforts to reconcile with India, which the PM Sharif tried to make. If we base on this logic, Pakistani generals decided to stake their all in Kashmir and to change the situation in the whole region with a single blow.
It was hardly by chance that the escalation of the Kashmir conflict coincides with the next failure of the negotiation process in Afghanistan between the Talibs and North Afghan opposition and with the beginning of the new large-scale attack of the Talibs to the northern enemy. The Taliban movement was not directly controlled by Islamabad and had become an independent regional force. This force is dangerous first of all for Pakistan.
All Over the Globe is published by IPA House.
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