from PoliTon
Dec 6
In Ust-Kamenogorsk, on the night of November 18th, the KNB arrested 22 people, including 12 Russian citizens. The arrested are accused of attempting to organize a revolt in Eastern Kazakhstan oblast, with intentions to separate this oblast from Kazakhstan and to establish a �Russki Altai� republic. A Russian citizen, leader of the political organization Rus Victor Kazimirchuk, alias Pugachov (Panorama # 46, 26 Nov 99), headed the extremist group. The arrest aroused different reactions in Kazakhstan and in Russia. The independent information agency PoliTon polled political analysts on the events in Ust-Kamenogorsk.
Analysts interviewed agreed unanimously that the incident was not of a criminal character, but of a political one. At the same time, opinions regarding the main initiators of the provocation varied. The theories fell into four camps.
Theory 1: Government Conspiracy
One group of analysts proposed that national government authorities had exaggerated the event, with help of the KNB. Although these experts believed that the 22 Russian militants were in fact organizing in Eastern Kazakhstan oblast, they believed that government leaders overblew the plot for their own purposes. They supported this theory with following arguments. First, in their opinion, government authorities blew the Ust-Kamenogorsk event out of proportion, making an extraordinary ballyhoo about it. Second, following the arrests, neither weapons nor money necessary for extremist acts were found during searches. The experts think that the found machine carbine cartridges, bottles with explosive mixture and metal sticks are not a serious fact to accuse them of a revolt in the Eastern Kazakhstan.
Third, some respondents called attention to the fact that the Eastern Kazakhstani KNB had been watching Victor Kazimirchuk and his supporters long before the arrests. KNB agents allegedly infiltrated the group. However, the KNB did not take proper measures to neutralize the extremists. They could have quietly deported Kazimirchuk along with the other Russian citizens, according to current legislation, but chose not to do so.
Fourth, the Kazakhstani authorities have inadequately treated other possible extremist and separatist threats in the country. They did not react to information about increasing Islamic extremism in Southern Kazakhstan as they did in Ust-Kamenogorsk.
This first group of analysts proposed several possible goals of the government authorities:
1) To draw away both Kazakhstani and international attention from recent scandalous events in Kazakhstan. In particular, the authorities managed to replace the theme of falsification of the Parliamentary election and demands by the united opposition in the Forum of Democratic Forces;
2) To consolidate the Kazakh population terrified by a �Russian threat� around the authorities who pretend to guarantee independence and territorial integrity;
3) To end anti-government moods among Russian Kazakhstanis by demonstrating decisive actions in respect to Russian separatists. Some experts suppose that the main mass of Russian people who do not wish to leave the country and who now are in difficult economic situations are extremely dissatisfied with government policy. In this situation, the authorities may attack the Russian movement in Kazakhstan and do everything to discredit it and to suppress protest against any national policy that violates the rights of ethnic Russians.
4) To balance recent rumors of the growing threat by Islamic�i.e. ethnic Kazakh�extremism in southern Kazakhstan with solid evidence of a �Russian threat� in the north.
5) To demonstrate the force and decisiveness of the authorities to the population and especially to the opposition. Some experts consider it possible that by creating myths of a Wahhabi invasion in the south and separatists in the north, the authorities are preparing for a state of emergency, if necessary.
6) As a pretense to press Russia and manipulate relations in Kazakhstan�s favor. Some experts are confident that against a background of recent scandals with Baikonur, restrictions on Russian imports, and pressure on Russian companies working in Kazakhstan, the Ust-Kamenogorsk incident is another anti-Russian act by the Kazakhstani authorities.
7) To demonstrate Kazakhstan�s loyalty to the West. Taking into consideration the West�s criticism of Russia at the recent OSCE summit, Kazakhstan created an obviously anti-Russian precedent. After the Ust-Kamenogorsk events, President Nazarbaev can pretend to be a fighter against Russian expansion in Central Asia and an opponent of the restored empire, rather than how the opposition potrays him, as an illegal President.
Theory 2: Authorities Makes Themselves Look Good
A second group of political analysts interviewed by PoliTon believed that the incident was entirely manufactured by government officials, not for political reasons but to boost their own careers. They think the KNB planned and organized the event to demonstrate its force to both the President and the population. In their opinion, several leaders, including the KNB chairman Alnur Musaev, the KNB Almaty oblast department chief Rakhat Aliev and Khabar TV channel director Dariga Nazarbaeva initiated the event. Khabar�s review of the Ust-Kamenogorsk events bore an uncanny resemblance to the arrest of Swiss businessman Gavin de Salis in 1997 by the tax police, which that time was headed by Aliev.
Theory 3: The Russians Did It
Experts supporting a third theory believe that Russian political and special services provoked the events. Possibly, they tried to examine moods of the population of the northern oblasts in Kazakhstan. They connect this version with the following arguments.
First, the place of the incident was chosen purposefully. The Eastern Kazakhstan oblast, especially after it merged with Semipalatinsk oblast, is characterized by a dominant majority of the Russians. Furthermore, in the late 1990s international tension has increased here.
Second, Russian special forces, The Army Headquarter, the State Duma and some groups of the Russian establishment showed interest and adequately reacted to the situation in Kazakhstan, especially regarding Russian people.
Third, some experts ascertained that the Russian government and Vladimir Putin firmly protect Russian national interests. Possibly, Kazakhstan is not an exception in this regard.
Fourth, referring to the statements by spokesmen of the Russian FSB and the Kazakhstani KNB, some experts state that Victor Kazimirchuk has connections with the Russian political elite and possesses both weapons and money. (Vremya MN, 30 Nov 99). In their opinion, without support by influential forces, he could hardly have done this in Ust-Kamenogorsk.
Proponents of the first two theories think that there are no political forces in Russia that are interested in destabilization of Kazakhstan. In their opinion, people in Russia worry about internal problems, foremost of which is the Chechen war. If influential forces had initiated the Ust-Kamenogorsk events, the action would have been more serious.
Theory 4: The Lone Radical
Finally, there is the straight-forward theory that Victor Kazimirchuk was the main initiator of the events. Neither any Russian political organizations nor Kazakh special services supported him. Experts referring to statements by Russian and Kazakhstani special services and Russian media, pay attention to the following facts:
First, Kazimirchuk planned to establish an independent state Russki Altai that was supposed to contain both Eastern Kazakhstan and Russian Altai, according to documents found during his arrest. In other words, his separatism was directed to Russia as well. For this reason, influential Russian political forces would have hardly supported Kazimirchuk and his followers activities.
Second, Kazimirchuk failed to find any support among some Russian public political organizations, as well as by Siberian Cossack Army (Russia) and the Verchny-Irtysh Cossack community (in Kazakhstan). Hence, he had not any significant support and worked with a small group of his comrades.
Thus, experts believe that the Ust-Kamenogorsk incident was Victor Kazimirchuk�s desire to realize his political ambitions. Some analysts suppose him to be a victim of misinformation of the moods of the population in northern Kazakhstan.
Some of the political analysts who blame Kazimirchuk do not think that the local authorities would actually initiate the events. In particular, they think that the government is not interested in encouraging extremist moods inside Kazakhstan. To strengthen stability of the ruling regime it is quite sufficient to play up the idea of �stable Kazakhstan, unstable world.�
This camp of analysts debunks the �blame Russia� theory by arguing that in Russia, with military operations in the Caucasus and worsening relations with the West, national patriotism has significantly increased. The events in Ust-Kamenogorsk only aroused a negative reaction in Russia. Some Russian influential circles will again touch the problem of the Russians in Kazakhstan and pressure the Kazakhstani government. There is an opinion that now it is unprofitable to Kazakhstan to spoil its relations with Russia, as after a new Russian President is election in 2000, it may cause serious consequences.
All Over the Globe is published by IPA House.
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